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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JUVENILES: RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF In
re GAULT DENIED IN WASHINGTON-Brumley v. Charles Denney
Juvenile Center, 77 Wn.2d 702, 466 P.2d 481 (1970).

Genevieve Fay Brumley was adjudged a delinquent child' by the
juvenile court of Snohomish County on December 12, 1966 after she
admitted telephoning bomb threats to local schools. Present at the
adjudicatory hearing were court personnel, her parents, a welfare caseworker, a probation officer, and a policeman. She was not represented
by counsel. During her subsequent incarceration, 2 the United States
Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings
in In re Gault.3 In August of 1968, Miss Brumley petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the Gault decision required a reversal of her conviction. The petition was denied.
The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed. Held: The right to
counsel extended to juveniles in In re Gault will not be applied retroactively in Washington. Brumley v. Charles Denney Juvenile Center,
77 Wn.2d 702, 466 P.2d 481 (1970).
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF DUE PROCESS
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS

Prior to 1899, children in this country above the age of seven were
accorded the same constitutional protections and were subjected to
the same penalties as adults. 4 A "tidal wave of reform" 5 resulted in
the passage of the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act, the first of its kind
in the United States. 6 One of the consequences of this reform was the
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1959) provides:
The words "delinquent child" mean any child under the age of eighteen years who
violates any law of this state, or any ordinance of any town, city or county of this
state defining a crime or who has violated any federal law or law of another state
defining a crime....
2. Id. § 13.04.095 (1970) provides in part:
When any child shall be found to be delinquent or dependent, within the meaning
of this chapter.... the court may commit the child:
(6) To the department of institutions if the court finds such child to be delinquent.... A child committed to the department of institutions shall be subject to
the supervision and control thereof....
3. 387 U.S. I(1967).
4. See Fortas, Equal Rights--For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 401, 405 (1967).

5. Id. at 406.
6. From the Illinois model, the system has spread to every state, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Gaut, 387 U.S. at 14.
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elimination of many procedural safeguards previously available to
juveniles. 7 In 1948, however, the United States Supreme Court, in
Haley v. Ohio,8 reversed a first-degree murder conviction because the

police had obtained a confession from a fifteen-year-old boy who had
been denied the assistance of counsel during interrogation. The Court
held that due process includes the right to counsel during the interrogation of juveniles. In Kent v. United States,!' the Court held that,
under the fourteenth amendment, the juvenile defendant was entitled
to a hearing which measures up to the "essentials of due process and
fair treatment," including a full investigation of the child's case, a
statement of the juvenile court's reasons for its decision, and the effective assistance of counsel.' 0
Subsequent to the Kent decision, the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice issued a Task Force
Report" t on juvenile delinquency revealing the shocking failures of
the juvenile court system. Observing that this system had generally
failed to rehabilitate delinquents, stem the tide of youth crime, or
bring "justice and compassion to the child offender,"' 1 the Commission concluded: ' 3
In theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal,

...

be-

cause it would act only in the best interest of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty
without due process of law-knowing not what else to do and needing,
whether admittedly or not, to act in the community's interest even
more imperatively than the child's. In theory it was to exercise its
protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold. In fact
there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention reinforces the
juvenile's unlawful impulses.

Sce Fortas. ,Ntpra note 4. at 406.
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
9. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
7.
8.

10. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546. In Kent the juvenile court judge did not hold a hearing.
nor did he confer with the petitioner's parents or counsel before he waived jurisdiction
and directed that petitioner be tried in federal district court.
I1.

LAW
TASK FORCE REPORTVONJUVENII EDELINQUENCY. PRESIDENT'SCOMMISSIO oN
AND YOLFI1

E'.i IO I NI \NI) AwI) IsIIRAIION Of .t ,ll(i. JUVINIII; Dii INQtEN(E(
('lRlmto (1967) 1hereinafter cited as TASK l'OR( E RI PORi I.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. at 9.
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The juvenile court system lacked sufficient procedural rules to fulfill
effectively the functions for which it had been created.
The United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault on May 15,
1967. Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault had been taken into custody for
making lewd and indecent remarks to a woman over the telephone.
His parents received no notice of their son's custody, nor were they
served with the delinquency petition. At the hearings which followed,
the court did not advise Gault of his right to counsel, testimony was
not required to be given under oath, and no transcript or record of the
proceedings was prepared. The complaining witness was not present
at any stage of the adjudicatory process. At the close of the final hearing, Gault was committed as a juvenile delinquent to an industrial
school "for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner
4
discharged by due process of law."1
The Court reversed the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Examining the difficulties Gault faced in defending himself,
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, concluded:' 5
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of
law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of
the proceedings and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare it. The child "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him."
The Court also ruled that Gault's questionable admission of guilt
and his accuser's absence from the trial had permitted an unreliable
adjudication of delinquency and had denied him the "essentials of due
process and fair treatment" guaranteed juveniles by the fourteenth
amendment. The Court noted that "inadequate and inaccurate findings of fact"'16 frequently result where fundamental requirements of
due process are not observed and concluded that due process of law
guarantees a juvenile, at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings, 17 the assistance of counsel, notice of hearings, the oppor14.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 7-8. Gault's sentence is shocking when compared to the

maximum penalty that could be imposed on an adult who had committed the same
offense.
The penalty specified in the Criminal Code, which would apply to an adult, is $5
to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months.
Id. at 8-9.
15. Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted).
16. Id. at 19-20.
17. The four stages of juvenile court proceedings are: intake, where the decision
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tunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege
against self-incrimination.
The Court has recently decided two cases concerning the scope of
the due process rights established in Gault. In re Winship' 8 dealt with
the proper standard of proof to be applied in delinquency hearings. A
twelve-year-old boy had been convicted of theft by a mere preponderance of the evidence and was sentenced to six years in a training
school. The conviction was reversed and the Court ruled that "the
constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as
much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those safeguards applied in Gault."" : In observing that
accurate findings of fact are required by the due process clause, the
Court viewed the reasonable doubt standard as a "prime instrument
for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error."2 0 In
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania2 the Court faced the question of a juvenile's right to trial by jury. Holding that due process for juvenile de22
fendants does not include this right, the Court explained:
[T] he applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness .... But one
cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component
of accurate factfinding.
In determining what due process guarantees are to be extended to
juveniles, the Court has consistently reasoned that only those which
tend to enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process will be applied to juvenile proceedings. The argument made in the following
section is that this same criterion should be, and has been, the central
issue in retroactivity determinations. Had the Brumley court given the

is made whether to detain the juvenile: waiver, where the decision is made to retain
or decline jurisdiction; adjudication. where the determination of guilt or innocence is
made: and disposition, which is analogous to sentencing in the trial of an adult. Comment. The Jtni'enile Cotirt Revolution in Wa, hingion, 44 W su. 1L.REv. 421. 428
(1969).
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). For a further discussion of It re Win.Uhip see Cohen.
Tihe Standard of Proof in .JIuvenile 'roceedingN: Gatlt Beyond a Reasonable Doitbt,
68 Nli( n. L. Riv. 567 (1970); 39 FORniHAM [L.REV. 121 (1970).
19. Win.ship, 397 U.S. at 368.
20. Id. at 363.
21. 91 S.Ct. 1976(1971).
22. Id. at 1985.
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reliability factor the weight it has received from the United States
Supreme Court, an opposite result would have been reached.

II.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF IN RE GAULT
DENIED

In re Lesperance23 was the first post-Gault case to reach the Washington Supreme Court in which a juvenile alleged denial of the assistance of counsel. After she had been adjudged a delinquent child, defendant Lesperance retained counsel to review the delinquency
hearing. The court ruled that because of Gault, which had been decided after the delinquency hearing but while the appeal was pending,
the judgment of the juvenile court must be reversed for failure to apprise the juvenile of her right to counsel in the adjudicatory stage of
the proceedings. Since the juvenile court's decision had been rendered
prior to In re Gault,24 the Lesperance court appeared to have applied
Gault retroactively. However, the appeal postponed the finalization of
the conviction beyond the date of the Gault decision. 2 5 Therefore,
application of the right to counsel in Lesperance was not truly retroactive.
The principal case clearly presents the retroactivity question. Miss
Brumley had not retained an attorney for the delinquency hearing and
she did not appeal the juvenile court's decision. Her attorney retained
after the delinquency hearing, sought the post-conviction remedy of
habeas corpus. Thus, her release was contingent upon a determination
of whether the Gault right to counsel should be applied retroactively

23. 72 Wn.2.d 572, 434 P.2d 602 (1967).
24. The hearing was held on April 14, 1967; the Gautlt decision was rendered on
May 15. 1967.
25. The appeal was decided November 24, 1967.

Miss Lesperance's proceeding had not been finalized when Gatll was announced.
Rather, it was before this court on direct review at that time. While the statutes
dealing with juvenile delinquency and dependency proceedings do not, with one exception not pertinent here, specifically provide for an appeal, appellate review by
certiorari is granted as a matter of course if a petition is timely filed. Miss Lesperance and her parents pursued such a course. In the present proceeding, neither

appellant nor her parents sought such a review. Appellant's delinquency adjudication, insofar as direct review be concerned, then, became final before the Gttult
rules were proclaimed. We do not, therefore, regard Lesperance as dispositive of

the question as to whether the pertinent Gatlt rule is wholly retroactive.
Brunley, 77 Wn.2d at 704-05, 466 P.2d at 483.
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to juveniles whose convictions had been finalized2 6 prior to Gault.
The Brumley court conceded that four out of five states have held
Gault retroactively applicable to adjudicatory hearings.2 7 Neverthe28
less, the court denied retroactive application of Gault in Washington:
IT Ihough Gault's right to counsel rule is intended to enhance the reliability and integrity of the fact-finding process ...retroactive application of that rule now would not, on balance, significantly further its
basic objectives....
The Brumley court prefaced its discussion of retroactivity with a
reference to the problem of implementing new procedural rules. The
court emphasized that application of Miranda v. Arizona 29 was held
to be prospective only and concluded that, because Gault was "more
far reaching and revolutionary" 3 0 than Miranda, Gault should likewise receive only prospective application. Better analogies, however,
would have been Gideon v. Wainwright,3 1 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in criminal trials is required by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, and Doughty v.
Maxwell,32 in which the Court applied Gideon retroactively. Gault
merely extended the Gideon rule to cases involving juveniles.

26. Both Miss Lesperance and Miss Brumley were tried prior to the Ga1lt decision.
After her conviction Miss Lesperance had retained counsel familiar with the method
of appealing a juvenile court decision. Although there is no statutory authority for
appeal, a writ of certiorari iscustomarily granted. Due to this fortunate circumstance.
Miss Lesperance received the constitutional benefits of Gault. Uninformed concerning
the benefits of counsel, and being personally unfamiliar with the grounds and procedure for appeal, Miss Brumley allowed the juvenile court's ruling to become
finalized. With no appeal pending when Gault was decided, Brumley could not receive
any constitutional guarantee. She was complaining because she had been denied
counsel and only counsel could have preserved her eligibility for the benefits of Gault.
27. [TIhe followin-g state courts have held Gault retrospectively applicable to
adjudicatory hearings.... Application of Billie, 103 Ariz. 16. 436 P.2d 130
(1968); Mar.sden '. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d I (Mass. 1967); State in re
J. M., 103 N.J. Super. 88. 246 A.2d 536 (1968); State ex rel. LaFollette v.
Circuit Court, 37 Wis. 2d 329. 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967).
77 Wn.2d at 705, 466 P.2d at 483. The Washington court cited two Florida state
appellate decisions for the proposition that Gailt should be applied only prospectively.
but noted parenthetically that a Florida Supreme Court decision, State v. Steinhauer,
216 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1968), implicitly discredits the two court of appeals holdings. Id.
at 705-06. 466 P.2d at 483.
28. /d. at 708-09. 466 P.2d at 484.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. Brunle', 77 Wn.2d at 706. 466 P.2d at 483.
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (per curium).
Applied retroactively, as Gideon was, the decision required re-trial and releases
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The Brumley court perceived a qualitative difference between the
role of defense counsel at a criminal trial and at a juvenile delinquency hearing. The latter, the court suggested, lacks the "technical
intricacies of a criminal trial;" 33 the juvenile court is "more concerned
with the correction of an erring child than with engaging in an adversary contest. 3 4 However, often a prosecution is aimed at conviction
rather than at a fair and accurate determination of guilt or innocence.
By discouraging any adversary quality in delinquency hearings, the
Brumley court has frustrated the effective assistance of counsel. In
considering the court's distinction between the technical intricacies of
adult and juvenile trials, emphasis should be given to the conclusion
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra35
tion of Justice:
The most informal and well-intentioned judicial proceedings .are technical; few adults without legal training can influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot. Papers are drawn and charges
expressed in legal language. Events follow one another in a manner
that appears arbitrary and confusing to the uninitiated. Decisions,
unexplained, appear too official to challenge.
The juvenile may have greater need for counsel than his usually more
experienced adult counterpart. At stake is the risk that an innocent
juvenile may be incarcerated and exposed to the dehumanizing prison
environment.
The court in Brumley summarized the method of determining
whether a new constitutional rule of procedure should be applied ret36
roactively.
Three factors are deemed relevant .... (1) The purpose of the new
rule and whether retroactive application of the rule would effectively
serve that purpose; (2) ... to what extent law enforcement agencies,

from prison unparalleled in American history. As to the future, it meant that five
states had to take immediate action to provide counsel where they had not pre-

viously provided it. No excuses about inadequate resources or about the absence of
enabling legislation would be accepted.
Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call For the End of the Linkletter
Doctrine,60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 417, 422-23 (1969).
33. Brtunley, 77 Wn.2d at 706, 466 P.2d at 483.
34. Id.
35. TASK FORCE REPORT, stpra note 11, at 32.
36. Brunley, 77 Wn.2d at 707, 466 P.2d at 483. The court simply paraphrased the

three-part test set out in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
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including courts, justifiably relied upon the pre-existing rule; and (3)
the effect of retroactive application upon the administration of justice.
Each factor is considered separately and "the process is one of balancing each against the other." 37 A careful analysis of this formula
dictates retroactivity where the new rule protects or increases the reli-

ability of the fact-finding process. Only where this criterion is not met
should consideration be given to the additional factors of reliance and
of the effect retroactivity would have upon the administration of jus-

tice. 3 8 The United States Supreme Court has never denied retroactive
application to a new rule which affects the reliability of the
fact-finding process. 3 9 On the other hand, rules which do not enhance

the accuracy of factual determination are generally applied only prospectively. 40 This consistency in the case law would appear to compel

37. Brundh', 77 Wn.2d at 707, 466 P.2d at 484.
38. If the new rule has a profound effect on the reliability of the fact-finding
process, then that rule will most probably be retroactive: if the new rule has some.
but less than a profound effect on trial reliability, then the criteria of reliance by
the authorities on the old rule and the effect upon the administration of justice of
a retroactive application of the new rule will be applied to determine whether the
new rule will be declared retroactive.
Comment, Retroactivily: A New Look a the Reliability Tle. t. 2 1 SN R( tS& L. RE,.
993. 996-97 (1970).
39. The following decisions held new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials
retroactive: Eskridge v. Washington. 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam). confirming the
retroactivity of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to transcript on appeal):
Doughty v. Maxwell. 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (per curiam). confirming the retroactivity of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to trial counsel): McNerlin v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 575 (1964). confirming the retroactivity of Jackson v. Denno. 378
U.S. 368 (1964) (due process violated where defendant convicted upon involuntary
confession): Lyles v. Beto, 379 U.S. 648 (1965) (per curiam). confirming the retroactivity of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 11964) (incriminating words of defendant. made after indictment and in absence of counsel, are inadmissible): Roberts
v. Russell. 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam). holding Bruton v. United States. 391
U.S. 123 (1968) (defendant's confession implicating co-defendant at a joint trial held
inadmissible), retroactive: NicConnell v. Rhay. 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam) holding retroactive Nlempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at sentencing
and probation revocation hearing): Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510. 523 n.22
(1968) (jurors can't be excluded upon basis of opposition to death penalty) holding
its own rule retroactive: Arsenault v. Massachusetts. 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam).
holding White v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 59 (1963) retroactive and confirming the retroactivity of Hamilton v. Alabama. 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (both cases: right to counsel at
arraignment) as well as Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel
on appeal): Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (per curiam). holding Barber
v. Page. 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (right to confrontation), retroactive: Ashe v. Swenson.
397 U.S. 436, 437 n.] (1970), confirming the retroactivity of Benton v. Maryland. 395
U.S. 784 (1969) (double-jeopardy).
40. The following cases held new constitutional decisions prospective in application: linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). holding prospective Nlapp v. Ohio.
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retroactivity in Brumley because, as determined in Gideon v. Wainwright, the constitutional right to counsel directly affects the reliability
of the fact-finding process.
The Brumley court determined Gault's main objective was "to insure, as far as possible, that a delinquency adjudicatory proceeding
would constitute a fair and judicious examination of the facts bearing
upon the particular issue of delinquency and lead to an accurate and
just determination." 4 ' This purpose, the court reasoned, would not be
effectuated by retroactive application of Gault for two reasons. First,
"it can be safely observed that the vast majority of juvenile proceedings carried out before Gault were fair and compassionate, resulted in
accurate factual determinations ... and concluded with appropriate
remedial dispositions."' 42 This confidence in the just outcome of
pre-Gault determinations is not shared by the United States Supreme
43
Court. The Court noted in Gault that the
[f] ailure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has
resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to
individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.
The second reason was that the reprocessing of juvenile cases "would
add little to the social and psychological attitude of the individual
involved.. ..-"44It seems inconceivable that the court would fail to recognize the positive effect of a retrial upon the attitudes (including

367 U.S. 643 (1961) (guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure); Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), holding prospective Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (non-neutral judicial and prosecutorial comment upon defendant's decision
not to testify forbidden); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), holding prospective both Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel during inter-

rogation) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (suspect must be warned of
right to counsel, right to remain silent and consequences of speaking where he is in
custody and police efforts have shifted from investigatory to accusatory); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), holding United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (both cases: right to counsel at line-ups
and show-ups) prospective; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam),
holding prospective Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968) (both cases: right to trial by jury); Desist v. United States, 394

U.S. 244 (1969). holding Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (right to privacy
where expected; search warrant required for "electronic eavesdropping") prospective.

41.
42.
43.

77 Wn.2d at 707, 466 P.2d at 484.
Id. at 707-08, 466 P.2d at 484.
387 U.S. at 19-20.

44.

Brwtnley, 77 Wn.2d at 708, 466 P.2d at 484.
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faith in criminal justice) of a wrongly-convicted youth. The court must
therefore have assumed that few, if any, convicted juveniles are actually innocent. But this is an argument the United States Supreme
Court consistently rejects when deciding questions of retroactivity.
Moreover, the continued incarceration of even a guilty youth whose
conviction was obtained unconstitutionally is far from certain to have
the rehabilitative effect upon the prisoner postulated for the juvenile
detention system. The credibility of juvenile criminal procedure is
undermined by judicial failure to assume the responsibilities imposed
by the Constitution. By begging the question before it, the court has
demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice justice to order and convenience.
A further reason why retroactivity would not serve the purpose
underlying the right to counsel was that tangible evidence would be
lost or destroyed, and witnesses' memories dimmed, resulting in "slight
chance that a new hearing, even with the assistance of counsel, would
result in more accurate findings of fact or more appropriate dispositional orders." 45 The issue, however, is not whether a rehearing will
improve the accuracy of a former factual determination, but whether
the original findings were sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of innocence. Even without regard to the accuracy of later findings, one may question the propriety of denying an individual his
constitutional rights because of events beyond his control.
Concluding that retroactive application of the right -to counsel guarantee would not serve the purpose underlying the rule, the Brumley
court turned to an examination of the second factor in the formula,
"reliance placed upon pre-Gault procedures by law enforcement, administrative, social and judicial agencies."'4 6 The court stated that
"it is difficult to envision a case wherein the extent of past reliance on
47
a presently discarded rule could be greater or more widespread,"
and that such reliance was "fully justified by the dearth of judicial
pronouncements to the contrary. '48 In view of the pronouncements
of the United States Supreme Court, however, such an assertion is

45.

id.

46.
47.

hi. at 709. 466 P.2d at 485.
i.. 466 P.2d at 484-85.

48.
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unwarranted. As early as 1948, in Haley v. Ohio, the court stated
that 49
the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him [is something]
the law should not sanction. Neither man nor child can be allowed to
stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements
of due process of law.
In Kent v. United States, 50 another pre-Gault decision, the Court
held: 51
The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is not a
grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is the essence of justice.
Thus, the Brumley court's justification for agency reliance serves only
to weaken its position.
Finally, the Brumley court considered the third factor in the retroactivity equation, the effect of retroactive application of Gault upon
the "administration of justice. ' '52 Envisioning the reprocessing of
"literally thousands" of pre-Gault delinquency determinations, the
court reasoned that such reconsideration would be "devastating,"
would "serve no useful purpose," and would "unwisely burden" court
calendars. 53 Considering, however, the far-reaching effect of the
retroactive application of Gideon v. Wainwright, Gault's retroactivity
should create comparatively minor difficulties in reprocessing. 54 Regardless of the difficulty, individual fights should never be subordinated
to judicial convenience.

49.
50.

332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948).
383 U.S. 541 (1966). See note 10 and accompanying text, supra.

51. Id. at 554, 561.
52. 77 Wn.2d at 709, 466 P.2d at 485.
53. Id. at 709-10, 466 P.2d at 485.
54. On August 31, 1970, 303 juveniles who had been committed prior to Gault
were still under the supervision of the Office of Juvenile Rehabilitation in Washington
State. Of these, 71 were incarcerated and 255 were on parole. Letter from Cameron R.
Dightman, Research Investigator, Washington Division of Institutions, to the Washington Law Review, November 4, 1970.
The Washington Court has not taken a position concerning whether probation or
the collateral consequences attached to a finding of guilt constitutes sufficient "custody"
to serve as the basis for federal habeas relief. See Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159,
162 (9th Cir. 1964).
It is also possible that the Washington Court would permit an unconstitutionally
convicted person to utilize other procedures to expunge the records of his conviction.
Possible procedures are the writ of coran nobis or a declaratory judgment proceeding.
Assuming that these remedies were made available, the total impact of Brumley would
not be limited to a quantum of 303 cases. Whether such remedies are available is far
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Gault's extension of procedural due process rights to juveniles appears doomed to prospective application in Washington. Similarly
55
doomed is In re Winship.
Juveniles such as Miss Brumley who were unfortunate enough to
have been incarcerated prior to Gault will be denied a right guaranteed
by the Constitution. Despite practical arguments for and against retroactivity, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
where the accuracy of a determination of guilt or innocence is enhanced
by a constitutional guarantee, due process requires retroactive invocation of that right, regardless of the passage of time. The right to counsel is such a guarantee-a requirement necessary to help avoid the
incarceration of innocent children.

from clear. See, e.g., Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wn. App. 334, 487 P2d 211 (1971) (Requiring
the government return fingerprints and photographs to acquitted person); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968) (conviction challenge allowed by person who had
served sentence).
55. See text accompanying note 18,.ittpra.
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